



Monthly Indicators

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Trust in Lower Rates

It's becoming increasingly clear that what has been mispriced in the interest rate market is long-term rates, not short-term rates. Instead of short-term rates proving to be unsustainably low, it is long-term rates that are proving to be unsustainably high. As more central banks fall off the Fed's tightening bandwagon, longer-term interest rate expectations are being rapidly challenged and recalibrated in the bond market.


Few economies in the world are showing the kind of resilience to central bank tightening that the bond market had believed. After looking at the once red-hot Canadian, Australian and UK economies slow in response to higher rates and currency moves, markets must rethink their longer-term expectations of just how high central banks can crank rates up. While historical comparisons may argue that short rates are still miles below neutral settings, recent economic evidence suggests rates are far less

accommodating than those comparisons would otherwise suggest.

The US economy, of course, remains the one outlier, with the American consumer shrugging off any effects of the Fed's 150 basis points of hikes. But even there, long-term rates have not risen, anchored by aggressive Asian central bank purchases of Treasury bonds. And further Fed hikes are soon likely to start packing a lot more of an economic punch. Double-digit housing price gains have substituted for savings, allowing consumers to spend all of their after-tax incomes. But with half of new mortgages now financed at the short end, refinancing has suddenly become a brake, not a boost, to US housing prices, and the consumption that it has spurred (see pages 4-5).

When a near zero US savings rate finally stops falling, consumer spending growth will be chopped down to size, casting a very different outlook on how high the funds rate will go from the one the market sees now.

Relative Performance of Trusts, Long Bonds, TSX



The obvious, although not the greatest beneficiary of falling long-term interest rates is the long bond. Our target of a 4% long Canada yield promises to give investors a double-digit return. But by far the greatest beneficiary of falling yields is the burgeoning income trust market, which has consistently outperformed the total return from either the long bond or the broad stock market (Chart). Not only is the trust market as a whole more leveraged than the bond market, but certain segments of the trust market, like power trusts, provide almost twice the leverage to falling rates than even the long Canada bond (see pages 6-9).

MARKET CALL

- With neither US GDP nor payrolls looking overheated, the Fed's tightening cycle will soon be over, with only a further 50 bps before an extended pause. Curve flattening has seen the 10-year Treasury approach our year-end target, but tame inflation and pension-related demand leave added rally room for the long bond.
- We see the US\$ rally as a temporary correction, akin to the one that knocked the euro back by roughly 10 figures in early 2004 before it launched the next move stronger. It's only a matter of time before markets again fixate on the US twin deficits, particularly once the Fed finishes its tightening course.
- The Canadian dollar has eased off during this bout of improved US\$ sentiment, but would heartily join in during any move by other majors to rally against the greenback. Export weakness suggests that the economy can't weather a stronger loonie. Look for negative yield spreads, encouraged by a Bank of Canada rate cut aimed at countering a soaring loonie, and softer non-energy resource prices, to send the C\$ into retreat again in the second half.

INTEREST & FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES

| END OF PERIOD: | 2005 | | | | | 2006 | |
|---|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| | 7-Feb | Mar. | June | Sep. | Dec. | June | Dec. |
| CDA Call loan (mid-point of range) | 2.50 | 2.50 | 2.25 | 2.25 | 2.25 | 2.25 | 2.25 |
| 98-Day Treasury Bills | 2.44 | 2.50 | 2.20 | 2.20 | 2.25 | 2.20 | 2.20 |
| Chartered Bank Prime | 4.25 | 4.25 | 4.00 | 4.00 | 4.00 | 4.00 | 4.00 |
| 2-Year Gov't Bond (3.25% 12/06) | 2.91 | 2.90 | 2.80 | 2.80 | 2.85 | 2.90 | 2.90 |
| 10-Year Gov't Bond (5% 06/14) | 4.42 | 4.15 | 3.95 | 3.95 | 3.90 | 3.85 | 3.80 |
| 30-Year Gov't Bond (5.75% 06/33) | 4.63 | 4.60 | 4.55 | 4.40 | 4.20 | 4.15 | 4.00 |
| U.S. Federal Funds Target | 2.50 | 2.75 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 3.00 |
| 91-Day Treasury Bills | 2.45 | 2.70 | 2.90 | 2.85 | 2.90 | 2.90 | 2.90 |
| 2-Year Gov't Note (3.125% 01/07) | 3.30 | 3.30 | 3.35 | 3.35 | 3.30 | 3.25 | 3.35 |
| 10-Year Gov't Note (4.25% 11/14) | 4.05 | 4.25 | 4.20 | 4.15 | 4.05 | 4.15 | 4.15 |
| 30-Year Gov't Bond (5.375% 02/31) | 4.43 | 4.70 | 4.50 | 4.45 | 4.30 | 4.55 | 4.50 |
| Canada - US T-Bill Spread | -0.01 | -0.20 | -0.70 | -0.65 | -0.65 | -0.70 | -0.70 |
| Canada - US 10-Year Bond Spread | 0.36 | -0.10 | -0.25 | -0.20 | -0.15 | -0.30 | -0.35 |
| Canada Yield Curve (30-Year — 2-Year) | 1.72 | 1.70 | 1.75 | 1.60 | 1.35 | 1.25 | 1.10 |
| US Yield Curve (30-Year — 2-Year) | 1.13 | 1.40 | 1.15 | 1.10 | 1.00 | 1.30 | 1.15 |
| EXCHANGE RATES | | | | | | | |
| — (US¢/C\$) | 79.6 | 84.0 | 79.4 | 79.1 | 76.9 | 75.2 | 77.5 |
| — (C\$/US\$) | 1.256 | 1.190 | 1.260 | 1.265 | 1.300 | 1.330 | 1.290 |
| — (Yen/US\$) | 105 | 105 | 104 | 103 | 97 | 95 | 94 |
| — (US\$/euro) | 1.28 | 1.34 | 1.40 | 1.38 | 1.37 | 1.38 | 1.39 |
| — (US\$/pound) | 1.86 | 1.89 | 1.91 | 1.90 | 1.90 | 1.91 | 1.91 |
| — (US¢/A\$) | 76.8 | 80.0 | 77.0 | 74.0 | 74.0 | 73.0 | 72.0 |

STRATEGY AND EARNINGS OUTLOOK

- We have pared our equity exposure to a benchmark 49%, shifting funds to income trusts, which are now double-weighted at 8% of our portfolio. Prospects for yield-sensitive assets have been bolstered by divergent Canadian and US monetary trends. We have also consequently hiked our bond overweight given good odds that weakness in the export sector and manufacturing will eventually prompt the Bank to cut rates. Our new 4% target implies a double-digit return for the long Canada. The trust sector, a top performer in 2004, should do even better with a 15-20% return, as TSX inclusion and liability legislation changes encourage institutional buying.
- Energy stocks have consistently outperformed the market in the last year. Our forecast of average \$50 crude still leaves 15% of headroom for the TSX energy group, prompting us to add to our longstanding overweight in that sector. Our other overweights, the dividend-rich telecommunications and utilities sectors, should be able to ride out any near-term weakness in equity markets as bond yields head lower. We've dropped our previous overweight in financials, since already-low loan loss provisions and the translational effect of the high C\$ on insurers limits bottom line momentum. Loonie-related profit fears and a slowing global factory sector have prompted us to maintain our underweight on industrial and material stocks.

Table 1



| ASSET MIX (%) | Benchmark | Strategy Recommendation |
|---------------------------------|-------------|-------------------------|
| Stocks | 49 | 49 |
| Bonds | 38 | 41 |
| Income Trusts | 4 | 8 |
| Cash | 9 | 2 |
| GICS SECTOR EQUITIES (%) | | |
| Consumer Discretionary | 6.5 | 5.0 |
| Consumer Staples | 4.6 | 4.6 |
| Energy | 19.5 | 24.0 |
| Financials | 32.3 | 32.3 |
| Healthcare | 1.6 | 1.6 |
| Industrials | 6.2 | 3.7 |
| Info Tech | 6.2 | 6.2 |
| Materials | 16.3 | 13.3 |
| Telecom | 5.4 | 6.9 |
| Utilities | 1.5 | 2.5 |

Note: Bold indicates recommended overweight

Table 2

| TSX - Earnings Outlook & Forward PE | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------|-----------------|--------------|
| | Operating Earnings (% chg) | | 4-qtr Fwd PE | |
| | 2004 | 2005 | Latest | Last 10 yrs. |
| Energy | 26.8 | 27.5 | 11.9 | 13.0 |
| Materials | 284.5 | 2.0 | 17.7 | 27.5 |
| Industrial | -3.4 | 1.4 | 19.7 | 15.6 |
| Consumer Discretionary | 29.1 | -14.2 | 22.5 | 18.6 |
| Consumer Staples | 7.4 | 4.7 | 19.0 | 17.0 |
| Health Care | 24.5 | 7.8 | 27.3 | 49.7 |
| Financials | 19.0 | 6.5 | 14.0 | 10.9 |
| Info Tech | 43.2 | 41.4 | 33.4 | 32.3 |
| Telecommunications | 18.1 | 13.0 | 15.0 | 34.7 |
| Utilities | 1.4 | 9.7 | 17.1 | 13.9 |
| TSX Composite | 32.0 | 10.4 | 15.5 | 17.9 |

na=not available/meaningful, due to negative year-earlier value



The End of Home-Made Savings

Benjamin Tal and Leslie Preston

American households are spending nearly every last penny of income, leaving the savings rate barely in the black. Some view it as a disaster waiting to happen, but Americans are merely responding rationally to their mounting wealth, compliments of a booming housing market. But that same rational behaviour dictates that Americans will at least stop dissaving, or even increase their savings when net worth stabilizes or falls. A 3% fed funds rate by mid-year should do the trick. It would temper activity in the ultra-expensive housing market, and further reduce the motivation to borrow against home equity—a factor that, in recent years, amplified considerably the impact of housing wealth on consumer spending.

Real Estate-Induced Saving Shortfall

At the heart of the US saving shortfall is the fact that the housing boom and dissaving go hand in hand. Any economics textbook will tell you that an increase in wealth, *ceteris paribus*, leads to decreased savings, and the US consumer has behaved in textbook fashion (Chart 1, left). Periods of rising net worth relative to income have been accompanied by a falling savings rate, which then levelled off when net worth relative to income fell in the wake of the stock market crash.

Households' rising real estate assets have been a key driver behind the growth in net worth since the mid-

1990s (Chart 1, right). Financial assets have yet to fully recover their stock market bubble-induced highs, while the housing market has never looked back since taking off in 1995. Moreover, that growing housing wealth is more widely distributed in the economy than financial assets. The Federal Reserve has estimated that only households in the top income quartile hold substantial liquid financial assets, whereas nearly 70% of households own their homes. That broader distribution means that gains in real estate wealth mean most for consumption, being concentrated in the population with the highest marginal propensity to consume.

Higher Rates Should Brake Real Estate Prices

The key to the real estate boom is interest rates. The historical relationship between interest rates and house price inflation is clear (Chart 2). The dramatic decline in the fed funds rate in the past four years has driven house prices inflation to 25-year highs. While many still take comfort in the fact that a 3% fed funds rate by mid-2005 would still be low by historical norms, this will be of little comfort to adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) holders—nearly half of new mortgages—who will see a 40% hike in interest payments.

Floating rate mortgages are losing some of their charm with every basis-point increase in short-term rates (Chart 3). And while some of the ARM refugees

Chart 1
Housing Boom Drives Wealth Effect






Chart 2
Interest Rates Key to House Prices



and potential home-buyers will find shelter in more expensive fixed-term mortgages, many could discover that they no longer qualify for a mortgage. In mid-2004 a family with a median income qualified for a mortgage of up to \$210,000. But by mid-2005 and 200 bps later, this amount will fall to \$175,000¹. The current Fed hiking program will price out no less than an estimated one-fifth of potential homebuyers. This reduced demand will translate into slower sales and softening/stabilizing house prices.

**Chart 3
Flatter Yield Curve Will Reduce ARM Appeal**



In fact, the heavy reliance on the short-end of the mortgage curve combined with the record-high level of real estate leverage suggests that past trends likely understate the current sensitivity of house prices to a rising fed funds rate. One need only look to Australia and the UK, where just a year after the first rate hikes by both central banks, house prices have flat-lined.

Home Equity Extraction Amplifies Housing Wealth Effect


Interest rates affect not only house values but also the ability of households to borrow and spend against them. Mortgage refinancing has been a major driver in American real estate markets since the beginning of the decade, accounting for a whopping 70% of total new mortgages in 2003. What enabled this unprecedented reliance on home equity withdrawal were of course low and falling interest rates, which, in

1. Calculations assume a 10% down payment and a 45 bp fee for private mortgage insurance. A household qualifies for a mortgage if payments, taxes, and insurance are 28% of income.
 2. Here we assume that average house prices will rise by 4% in 2005 and mortgage refinancing activity will account for 25% of mortgage origination.

turn, amplified the housing wealth effect on consumer spending and contributed to the decline in the savings rate.


But the first leg of Fed tightening has already exposed this market’s vulnerability to higher rates, with mortgage refinancing activity falling dramatically in 2004. The second leg of Fed tightening will bring the refi market to its knees (Chart 4).

**Chart 4
Rising Rates; Falling Refi Activity**



This powerful combination of slowing real estate gains and reduced home equity withdrawal will slash the housing wealth effect by more than half in 2005, bringing it back to its pre-housing boom level² (Chart 5). That will end the era of home-made saving, forcing households to start saving the old-fashioned way. Look for the savings rate to bottom out in the second half of 2005, with consumption barely catching up with a dismal 2.5% annualized gain in real disposable income.

**Chart 5
Housing-Related Contributions to Personal Consumption***




Source: National Center for Real Estate Research, CIBCWM

The Income Trust Market

Jeff Rubin and Peter Buchanan

From its meagre scale a decade or two back, the Canadian income trust market has grown by leaps and bounds, with a total market capitalization of roughly \$120 billion last year (Chart 1). The 330% increase in market cap over the last three years eclipses the growth rate of other key asset classes during this period. What's driving the income trust market, and will returns continue to outpace those from more traditional stock and bond investments?

Chart 1
Rapid Growth of Income Trust Market




Income Trusts have Outperformed Other Asset Classes

Income trusts have consistently outperformed both the stock market and the bond market over the last three years, covering both bear and bull market conditions for equities (Chart 2). Moreover, the performance gap has been substantial: 14%-pts above the TSX in 2004, 10%-pts in 2003, and 25%-pts in 2002. Note that the greatest outperformance came in a year of negative equity market returns (2002), attesting to the relative independence of this asset class from the performance of the broad equity market.

This relative outperformance bears witness to some notable benefits of the income trust structure. Beyond the well-noted advantage of avoiding corporate income tax, the need to pay out a hefty and stable

Chart 2
Income Trusts Have Consistently Outperformed




proportion of cash keeps management from undertaking economically non-viable projects, which create little added shareholder value. Ownership of the equity and most of the debt by a common entity also enhances financial flexibility, particularly in areas like balance sheet restructuring.

Yield is Almost a Third of Total Return

Yield is an extremely important component of return for income trust investors. Indeed, the driving force behind the creation of income trusts was to put earnings in the actual hands of investors. Whereas dividends accounted for only 1.8%-pts of the 14.5% total return from the TSX last year, distributions accounted for fully a third of the 28.5% total return from income trusts. Income trusts' performance and financial characteristics make them a viable alternative to dividend stocks for investors more interested in current income than future valuation gains. The near-10% cash yield provided by the typical TSX-listed income trust in 2004 surpassed even the highest dividend-paying stocks. Cash distributions, moreover, accounted for a third of the total return of the typical income trust in 2004 versus about 20% of the return for the top quartile of high dividend-paying issues (Chart 3).


Chart 3
Total Return by Component, 2004



Market Shifting from Retail to Institutional Base


Originally income trusts were designed to appeal primarily to retail investors in search of attractive yields. Potential unlimited liability arising from trusts discouraged wide-scale participation in the market by pension plans, since most pension plans are prohibited from investing in any security that carries such risk. However, recent statutory changes in Ontario and Alberta and previously enacted Québec legislation now protect investors from unlimited liability arising from trust ownership. That, in turn, should pave the way for more institutional involvement in the income trust market place. Institutions already appear to be bolstering their exposure, buying over 40% of the new trust issues coming on the market in 2004. That's up appreciably from only 26% in 2001 (Chart 4).

Chart 4
Rising Institutional Share of New Trust Issues



That figure will almost certainly rise further as Standard & Poor's decision to include income trusts in the TSX Composite encourages institutional investors to add more weight in what has been the best performing asset class in recent years. The inclusion of trusts in the TSX benchmark should lever as much as \$3 billion of funds flow from index funds to the market. A potentially even larger amount could flow from actively managed funds, whose critical performance benchmark will soon contain as many as 63 income trusts (Chart 5).


Chart 5
Expected Trust Market Inflows from Inclusion in TSX Composite



From their original inception in the commercial real estate market and in the oil and gas sector, trusts have evolved from a specialty investment to a broad asset class with representation from all walks of the economy. In fact over the last two years, the most rapidly expanding part of the market has been outside the traditional area of REITs and oil and gas royalty funds.

In 2001, almost 60% of the trust market was with REITs or oil and gas royalty trusts. Relatively stable cash flow and low capital expenditures made both sectors ideally suited to the trust mechanism. However in recent years, the growth of the trust market has been spearheaded by business trusts, which are basically a catchall category that excludes utilities, energy companies and commercial real estate companies. General business trusts now account for a third of the total capitalization of the trust market in Canada, against barely 12% just 3-4 years ago (Chart 6).

**Chart 6
Business Trusts Fastest Growing Sector**




While the oil and gas sector remains one of the more dynamic sectors of the trust market, returns last year were not significantly different than the returns investors received from the TSX oil and gas sector. Business trusts on the other hand have offered investors the greatest return pick-up over comparable segments of the TSX (Chart 7).

Interest Rates and the Income Trust Market


Beyond augmented overall performance, income trusts can also add vital diversity to an equity or bond portfolio, shielding investors against general stock market volatility. The beta of the typical income trust is about 0.6. That means that the average income trust is little more than half as sensitive as the typical conventional corporate stock to broadly based

**Chart 7
Business & Energy Trusts Have Provided Best Returns**



movements in the market. As noted, in sectors where corporations and trusts both exist, the average beta of the comparable trust sector was lower—generally by a fairly significant amount (Chart 8).

**Chart 8
Betas—Income Trusts vs. Conventional Stocks**




While income trusts outperformed conventional stocks during the market’s rough patch 2-3 years ago, they are by no means recession proof. Nor are they fully insulated from more firm-specific risks, like differences in management quality, operating scale and capital costs. The income trusts’ ability to pay unit holders depends, ultimately, on the health of the underlying businesses’ cash flows. Income trusts that have run into business difficulties and which have subsequently had to cut monthly distributions to investors have been penalized heavily in the market place. As such, income trusts cannot be viewed as a bulletproof alternative to a balanced portfolio of debt instruments and stocks during economic downturns. We would expect fixed income assets to outperform trusts during such periods, just as they would outperform stocks.

Income trusts do, however, provide the greatest leverage to falling interest rates of all major asset classes. In part, that’s due to the positive cash flow implications of lower rates. Lower yields reduce the interest expense costs on the money the typical trust owes to banks and other outside financial intermediaries, leaving more cash for unit holders. Above and beyond that, the generous 10% yield of the average trust means that investors view trusts as an inviting alternative to typically lower-yielding fixed income instruments.

Our analysis of data for the past decade shows that on average a 100-bp decline in long-term interest rates has normally resulted in a 12.4% appreciation in the share price of the typical income trust (Chart 9). That's double the 6% or so average capital appreciation for the 899 bonds in the *CIBC World Markets Bigar Index*. And it's roughly triple the sensitivity of the Canadian equity market as a whole to long-term interest rate swings. A 100-bps drop in long-term rates historically has lifted the power/utilities sector by 22%, making that sector an even larger play on rates than the long Canadas. Income trusts are, on average, also a third more rate sensitive than bank stocks, a traditional vehicle on the equity side for betting on falling interest rates.

Chart 9
Interest Sensitivity—Income Trusts vs. Bonds vs. Yield Sensitive Equities




Our own bullish call for oil prices should help to shield energy trusts from varying business conditions. Other trusts are potentially more exposed, however, to the economy's twists and turns. General business entities do not have the full potential upside that REITs or

power/utility trusts have to falling interest rates that accompany a weaker economy. And that more limited rate sensitivity helps make them more vulnerable to the business cycle than other trust groups. The 2000-2001 slowdown in the North American economy constitutes a case in point. An investor holding a broad basket of income trusts would have done about 10% better as growth downshifted than one holding just business trusts. That pattern reversed itself as the economy revived (Chart 10).

Trust in Lower Rates

In a world of declining bond yields, income trusts are likely to win favour with an increasing number of both retail and institutional investors. While they currently account for only 4% of our CIBC World Markets benchmark, they are likely to increase their weight. More importantly they are likely to generate superior returns as long as the Canadian economy continues to expand and inflation and interest rates remain benign.

Chart 10
Business Trusts Most Sensitive to Economy's Performance



ECONOMIC UPDATE

| | 04Q4A/F | 05Q1F | 05Q2F | 05Q3F | 05Q4F | 2004A/F | 2005F | 2006F |
|------------------------------------|---------|-------|-------|-------|-------|---------|-------|-------|
| CANADA | | | | | | | | |
| Real GDP Growth (AR) | 2.1 | 2.5 | 2.1 | 2.6 | 3.4 | 2.7 | 2.6 | 3.1 |
| Real Final Domestic Demand (AR) | 3.8 | 3.3 | 3.0 | 3.2 | 3.7 | 3.6 | 3.3 | 3.5 |
| All Items CPI Inflation (Y/Y) | 2.3 | 2.3 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| Core CPI Inflation (Y/Y) | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.8 |
| Unemployment Rate (%) | 7.1 | 7.1 | 7.2 | 7.3 | 7.3 | 7.2 | 7.2 | 7.2 |
| Merchandise Trade Balance (C\$ Bn) | 65.6 | 66.2 | 63.4 | 59.0 | 57.4 | 67.8 | 61.5 | 54.0 |
| U.S. | | | | | | | | |
| Real GDP Growth (AR) | 3.1 | 3.8 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 3.6 | 4.4 | 3.4 | 3.2 |
| Real Final Sales (AR) | 2.7 | 3.2 | 3.5 | 3.0 | 3.8 | 4.0 | 3.4 | 3.3 |
| All Items CPI Inflation (Y/Y) | 3.3 | 2.9 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 2.7 | 2.4 | 2.2 |
| Core CPI Inflation (Y/Y) | 2.1 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 1.8 | 2.2 | 2.1 |
| Unemployment Rate (%) | 5.4 | 5.3 | 5.4 | 5.5 | 5.5 | 5.5 | 5.4 | 5.4 |

CANADA

- The factory sector may have temporarily avoided layoffs in January, but a disappointing total employment tally to start 2005 left more reliable indicators of trend job creation (e.g., the three-month average change) looking notably soft. Notwithstanding a long overdue improvement in productivity, labour market stumbles suggest Q4's tepid GDP growth pace will be carried over to the first half. On that score, data revisions may have left the fourth quarter net trade position in better shape than previously envisioned, but monthly GDP results continue to point to little more than 2% annualized growth for the final quarter of 2004.

UNITED STATES

- Q4 GDP will likely be revised higher, on better trade and construction spending figures than initially assumed, and we've raised Q1 a bit after solid January non-auto retailing. But US real GDP growth seems set to settle in near 3½% for 2005, as a coming turnaround in net exports is offset by a drag from sluggish government spending and more temperate debt-financed consumption. Q1 might feature a softer capital spending tally after tax incentives expired at year end.

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CANADA RELEASE AND EVENT DATES February 2005



| MONDAY | TUESDAY | WEDNESDAY | THURSDAY | FRIDAY | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|-----------|-------|------|-----|-------|------|-----|-----|------|--|-----------------|---|---------|------|-------|-------|--------|-------|-------|-------|------|--|---|---|--|-----------|---------------------|------------------|---------------|--------|------|-------|--------|------|----------|---|-----------|-----|------|-----|-------|------|-----|-------|------|------|------|------|---|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|--|--|--|---|
| <p>31</p> <p>GDP AT BASIC PRICES 8:30 AM (1997\$) INDUST. PROD.</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>M</th> <th>Y</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>SEP</td> <td>0.1</td> <td>-0.2</td> </tr> <tr> <td>OCT</td> <td>0.0</td> <td>-0.1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>NOV</td> <td>0.2</td> <td>0.2</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> | | M | Y | SEP | 0.1 | -0.2 | OCT | 0.0 | -0.1 | NOV | 0.2 | 0.2 | <p>1</p> | <p>2</p> | <p>3</p> <p>INTERNATIONAL RESERVES 8:15 AM</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>M</th> <th>\$BN</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>NOV</td> <td>-2.389</td> <td>34.1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>DEC</td> <td>0.396</td> <td>34.5</td> </tr> <tr> <td>JAN</td> <td>0.123</td> <td>34.6</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> | | M | \$BN | NOV | -2.389 | 34.1 | DEC | 0.396 | 34.5 | JAN | 0.123 | 34.6 | <p>4</p> <p>LABOUR FORCE SURVEY 7:00 AM</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>EMPLOY (HOUSE)</th> <th>UNEMP RATE</th> <th>AVG HRLY EARN</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>NOV</td> <td>0.0</td> <td>1.6</td> <td>7.2</td> </tr> <tr> <td>DEC</td> <td>0.1</td> <td>1.4</td> <td>7.0</td> </tr> <tr> <td>JAN</td> <td>0.0</td> <td>1.4</td> <td>7.0</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>IVEY PURCHASING MANAGERS' INDEX 10:00 AM</p> | | EMPLOY (HOUSE) | UNEMP RATE | AVG HRLY EARN | NOV | 0.0 | 1.6 | 7.2 | DEC | 0.1 | 1.4 | 7.0 | JAN | 0.0 | 1.4 | 7.0 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | M | Y | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| SEP | 0.1 | -0.2 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| OCT | 0.0 | -0.1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| NOV | 0.2 | 0.2 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | M | \$BN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| NOV | -2.389 | 34.1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| DEC | 0.396 | 34.5 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| JAN | 0.123 | 34.6 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | EMPLOY (HOUSE) | UNEMP RATE | AVG HRLY EARN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| NOV | 0.0 | 1.6 | 7.2 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| DEC | 0.1 | 1.4 | 7.0 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| JAN | 0.0 | 1.4 | 7.0 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| <p>7</p> <p>BUILDING PERMITS 8:30 AM</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>(RES)</th> <th>(NON-RES)</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>OCT</td> <td>2.0</td> <td>0.2</td> </tr> <tr> <td>NOV</td> <td>2.2</td> <td>21.3</td> </tr> <tr> <td>DEC</td> <td>8.2</td> <td>-9.4</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> | | (RES) | (NON-RES) | OCT | 2.0 | 0.2 | NOV | 2.2 | 21.3 | DEC | 8.2 | -9.4 | <p>8</p> <p>HOUSING STARTS 8:15 AM</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>TOTAL</th> <th>SINGLES</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>NOV</td> <td>244.5</td> <td>101</td> </tr> <tr> <td>DEC</td> <td>236.3</td> <td>102</td> </tr> <tr> <td>JAN</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table> | | TOTAL | SINGLES | NOV | 244.5 | 101 | DEC | 236.3 | 102 | JAN | | | <p>9</p> | <p>10</p> <p>MERCHANDISE TRADE 8:30 AM</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>\$MN</th> <th>12 MO. BALANCE</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>OCT</td> <td>5,208</td> <td>65,826</td> </tr> <tr> <td>NOV</td> <td>5,406</td> <td>67,100</td> </tr> <tr> <td>DEC</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table> | | \$MN | 12 MO. BALANCE | OCT | 5,208 | 65,826 | NOV | 5,406 | 67,100 | DEC | | | <p>11</p> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | (RES) | (NON-RES) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| OCT | 2.0 | 0.2 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| NOV | 2.2 | 21.3 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| DEC | 8.2 | -9.4 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | TOTAL | SINGLES | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| NOV | 244.5 | 101 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| DEC | 236.3 | 102 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| JAN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | \$MN | 12 MO. BALANCE | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| OCT | 5,208 | 65,826 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| NOV | 5,406 | 67,100 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| DEC | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| <p>14</p> <p>CAR & TRUCK SALES 8:30 AM</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>TOTAL</th> <th>DOMESTIC BUILT CAR SALES</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>OCT</td> <td>1,635</td> <td>603</td> </tr> <tr> <td>NOV</td> <td>1,584</td> <td>568</td> </tr> <tr> <td>DEC</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>SURVEY OF MANUFACTURING 8:30 AM</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>M</th> <th>Y</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>OCT</td> <td>-1.0</td> <td>10.0</td> </tr> <tr> <td>NOV</td> <td>0.2</td> <td>11.1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>DEC</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table> | | TOTAL | DOMESTIC BUILT CAR SALES | OCT | 1,635 | 603 | NOV | 1,584 | 568 | DEC | | | | M | Y | OCT | -1.0 | 10.0 | NOV | 0.2 | 11.1 | DEC | | | <p>15</p> <p>British Columbia Budget</p> | <p>16</p> | <p>17</p> <p>INT'L TRANSACTIONS IN SECURITIES C\$BN 8:30 AM</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>NET BONDS</th> <th>NET MONEY MARKET</th> <th>NET STOCKS</th> <th>NET TOTAL</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>OCT</td> <td>0.7</td> <td>1.0</td> <td>0.6</td> <td>2.2</td> </tr> <tr> <td>NOV</td> <td>6.3</td> <td>-0.3</td> <td>1.2</td> <td>7.2</td> </tr> <tr> <td>DEC</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>WAGE SETTLEMENTS 10:00 AM (%)</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>PVT.</th> <th>PUB.</th> <th>TOT.</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>OCT</td> <td>2.6</td> <td>1.8</td> <td>2.0</td> </tr> <tr> <td>NOV</td> <td>2.0</td> <td>1.2</td> <td>1.5</td> </tr> <tr> <td>DEC</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table> | | NET BONDS | NET MONEY MARKET | NET STOCKS | NET TOTAL | OCT | 0.7 | 1.0 | 0.6 | 2.2 | NOV | 6.3 | -0.3 | 1.2 | 7.2 | DEC | | | | | | PVT. | PUB. | TOT. | OCT | 2.6 | 1.8 | 2.0 | NOV | 2.0 | 1.2 | 1.5 | DEC | | | | <p>18</p> <p>WHOLESALE TRADE 8:30 AM</p> |
| | TOTAL | DOMESTIC BUILT CAR SALES | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| OCT | 1,635 | 603 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| NOV | 1,584 | 568 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| DEC | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | M | Y | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| OCT | -1.0 | 10.0 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| NOV | 0.2 | 11.1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| DEC | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | NET BONDS | NET MONEY MARKET | NET STOCKS | NET TOTAL | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| OCT | 0.7 | 1.0 | 0.6 | 2.2 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| NOV | 6.3 | -0.3 | 1.2 | 7.2 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| DEC | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | PVT. | PUB. | TOT. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| OCT | 2.6 | 1.8 | 2.0 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| NOV | 2.0 | 1.2 | 1.5 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| DEC | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| <p>21</p> <p>RETAIL TRADE 8:30 AM</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>M</th> <th>Y</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>OCT</td> <td>1.2</td> <td>6.4</td> </tr> <tr> <td>NOV</td> <td>-0.1</td> <td>6.7</td> </tr> <tr> <td>DEC</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table> | | M | Y | OCT | 1.2 | 6.4 | NOV | -0.1 | 6.7 | DEC | | | <p>22</p> <p>CONSUMER PRICE INDEX 7:00 AM</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>M (NSA)</th> <th>Y</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>NOV</td> <td>0.4</td> <td>2.4</td> </tr> <tr> <td>DEC</td> <td>-0.2</td> <td>2.1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>JAN</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>LEADING INDICATOR 8:30 AM</p> | | M (NSA) | Y | NOV | 0.4 | 2.4 | DEC | -0.2 | 2.1 | JAN | | | <p>23</p> <p>Federal Budget @4:00 PM</p> | <p>24</p> | <p>25</p> <p>BALANCE OF INT'L PAYMENTS 8:30 AM</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>CURR.ACCT. \$BN(QR)</th> <th>BALANCE \$BN(AR)</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>04:Q2</td> <td>11.2</td> <td>44.8</td> </tr> <tr> <td>04:Q3</td> <td>9.4</td> <td>37.6</td> </tr> <tr> <td>04:Q4</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>QUARTERLY FINANCIAL STATISTICS 8:30 AM</p> <p>MONEY SUPPLY M-2</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>M</th> <th>Y</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>NOV</td> <td>-0.7</td> <td>6.0</td> </tr> <tr> <td>DEC</td> <td>0.8</td> <td>6.2</td> </tr> <tr> <td>JAN</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table> | | CURR.ACCT. \$BN(QR) | BALANCE \$BN(AR) | 04:Q2 | 11.2 | 44.8 | 04:Q3 | 9.4 | 37.6 | 04:Q4 | | | | M | Y | NOV | -0.7 | 6.0 | DEC | 0.8 | 6.2 | JAN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | M | Y | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| OCT | 1.2 | 6.4 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| NOV | -0.1 | 6.7 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| DEC | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | M (NSA) | Y | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| NOV | 0.4 | 2.4 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| DEC | -0.2 | 2.1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| JAN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | CURR.ACCT. \$BN(QR) | BALANCE \$BN(AR) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 04:Q2 | 11.2 | 44.8 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 04:Q3 | 9.4 | 37.6 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 04:Q4 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | M | Y | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| NOV | -0.7 | 6.0 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| DEC | 0.8 | 6.2 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| JAN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| <p>28</p> <p>GDP AT BASIC PRICES 8:30 AM (1997\$) INDUST. PROD.</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>M</th> <th>Y</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>OCT</td> <td>0.0</td> <td>-0.1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>NOV</td> <td>0.2</td> <td>0.2</td> </tr> <tr> <td>DEC</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 8:30 AM</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>REAL GDP %ch AR</th> <th>PRICE DEFLETOR %ch AR</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>04:Q2</td> <td>3.9</td> <td>5.8</td> </tr> <tr> <td>04:Q3</td> <td>3.2</td> <td>3.5</td> </tr> <tr> <td>04:Q4</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table> | | M | Y | OCT | 0.0 | -0.1 | NOV | 0.2 | 0.2 | DEC | | | | REAL GDP %ch AR | PRICE DEFLETOR %ch AR | 04:Q2 | 3.9 | 5.8 | 04:Q3 | 3.2 | 3.5 | 04:Q4 | | | <p>1</p> <p>INDUSTRIAL PRICES 8:30 AM</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>M (NSA)</th> <th>Y</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>NOV</td> <td>-2.0</td> <td>3.8</td> </tr> <tr> <td>DEC</td> <td>0.3</td> <td>3.8</td> </tr> <tr> <td>JAN</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>Bank of Canada Interest Rate Announcement</p> | | M (NSA) | Y | NOV | -2.0 | 3.8 | DEC | 0.3 | 3.8 | JAN | | | <p>2</p> | <p>3</p> <p>INTERNATIONAL RESERVES 8:15 AM</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>M</th> <th>\$BN</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>DEC</td> <td>0.396</td> <td>34.5</td> </tr> <tr> <td>JAN</td> <td>0.123</td> <td>34.6</td> </tr> <tr> <td>FEB</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table> | | M | \$BN | DEC | 0.396 | 34.5 | JAN | 0.123 | 34.6 | FEB | | | <p>4</p> <p>IVEY PURCHASING MANAGERS' INDEX 10:00 AM</p> | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | M | Y | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| OCT | 0.0 | -0.1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| NOV | 0.2 | 0.2 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| DEC | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | REAL GDP %ch AR | PRICE DEFLETOR %ch AR | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 04:Q2 | 3.9 | 5.8 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 04:Q3 | 3.2 | 3.5 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 04:Q4 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | M (NSA) | Y | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| NOV | -2.0 | 3.8 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| DEC | 0.3 | 3.8 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| JAN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | M | \$BN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| DEC | 0.396 | 34.5 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| JAN | 0.123 | 34.6 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| FEB | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

All data seasonally adjusted except where noted "NSA". M: per cent change from previous month. Q: per cent change from previous quarter at annual rates. Y: per cent change from year earlier. AR: Annual Rate. YTD: Year to date. Release dates are provided by sources outside CIBC World Markets. Dates are subject to change. Sources for historical data: U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Department of Labour, and U.S. Federal Reserve Board.

U.S. RELEASE AND EVENT DATES February 2005



| MONDAY | TUESDAY | WEDNESDAY | THURSDAY | FRIDAY |
|---|---|---|--|---|
| <p>31</p> <p>PERS. INCOME & OUTLAYS</p> <p>8:30 AM SAVING INCOME CONS RATE</p> <p>OCT 0.8 0.8 0.2 NOV 0.4 0.4 0.3 DEC 3.7 0.8 3.4</p> <p>NEW HOME SALES 10:00 AM</p> <p>CHICAGO PMI 10:00 AM</p> | <p>1</p> <p>ISM MANUFACTURING SURVEY (Formerly NAPM)</p> <p>10:00 AM COMP. PRICES INDEX INDEX</p> <p>NOV 57.6 74.0 DEC 57.3 72.0 JAN 56.4 69.0</p> <p>DOMESTIC AUTO SALES</p> | <p>2</p> <p>FOMC Rate Announcement @2:15 PM</p> | <p>3</p> <p>NON-FARM PRODUCTIVITY</p> <p>8:30 AM Q/Q (AR) Y/Y 04:Q2 (R) 3.9 4.9 04:Q3 (R) 1.8 3.1 04:Q4 (P) 0.8 2.5</p> <p>ISM NON-MFG SURVEY 10:00 AM</p> <p>FACTORY ORDERS</p> <p>10:00 AM M Y OCT 0.9 9.1 NOV 1.4 11.6 DEC 0.3 9.9</p> | <p>4</p> <p>EMPLOYMENT SITUATION</p> <p>8:30 AM NON-FARM CIV AVG FARM UNEMP HRLY PAYROLL RATE EARN (000s) M % Y NOV 132 5.4 2.4 DEC 133 5.4 2.6 JAN 146 5.2 2.6</p> <p>MICHIGAN SENTIMENT (F) 9:45 AM</p> |
| <p>7</p> <p>CONSUMER CREDIT 3:00PM</p> | <p>8</p> | <p>9</p> <p>WHOLESALE TRADE 10:00 AM</p> | <p>10</p> <p>GOODS & SERVICES BALANCE (BOP)</p> <p>8:30 AM GDS SERV TOT OCT -60.1 4.1 -56.0 NOV -64.1 3.8 -60.3 DEC</p> <p>TREASURY BUDGET 2:00 PM</p> | <p>11</p> |
| <p>14</p> | <p>15</p> <p>RETAIL SALES</p> <p>8:30 AM M Y NOV 0.1 7.2 DEC 1.2 8.7 JAN</p> <p>BUSINESS INVENTORIES 10:00 AM</p> | <p>16</p> <p>HOUSING STARTS</p> <p>8:30 AM MIL (AR) M NOV 1.807 -12.5 DEC 2.004 10.9 JAN</p> <p>CAPACITY UTIL/IND. PROD.</p> <p>9:15 AM LEV M Y NOV 78.6 0.2 3.6 DEC 79.2 0.8 4.3 JAN</p> | <p>17</p> <p>LEADING INDICATOR 10:00 AM</p> <p>PHILADELPHIA FED INDEX 12:00 AM</p> <p>MONEY SUPPLY M-2</p> <p>4:30 PM M Y NOV 0.6 5.3 DEC 0.4 5.6 JAN</p> | <p>18</p> <p>PRODUCER PRICE INDEX</p> <p>8:30 AM M (SA) Y (NSA) NOV 0.5 5.0 DEC -0.7 4.1 JAN</p> |
| <p>21</p> <p>PRESIDENT'S DAY (MARKETS CLOSED)</p> | <p>22</p> <p>CONSUMER CONFIDENCE 10:00 AM</p> | <p>23</p> <p>CONSUMER PRICE INDEX</p> <p>8:30 AM M (SA) Y (NSA) NOV 0.2 3.5 DEC -0.1 3.3 JAN</p> <p>FOMC Minutes</p> | <p>24</p> <p>DURABLE GOODS ORDERS</p> <p>8:30 AM M Y NOV 2.0 10.0 DEC 1.1 9.3 JAN</p> | <p>25</p> <p>GDP (AR)</p> <p>8:30 AM REAL IMPLICIT GDP DEFLATOR</p> <p>04:Q3(F) 4.0 1.4 04:Q4(A) 3.1 2.0 04:Q4(P)</p> <p>EXISTING HOME SALES 10:00 AM</p> |
| <p>28</p> <p>PERS. INCOME & OUTLAYS</p> <p>8:30 AM SAVING INCOME CONS RATE</p> <p>NOV 0.4 0.4 0.3 DEC 3.7 0.8 3.4 JAN</p> <p>NEW HOME SALES 10:00 AM</p> <p>CHICAGO PMI 10:00 AM</p> | <p>1</p> <p>ISM MANUFACTURING SURVEY (Formerly NAPM)</p> <p>10:00 AM COMP. PRICES INDEX INDEX</p> <p>DEC 58.6 72.0 JAN 56.4 69.0 FEB</p> <p>DOMESTIC AUTO SALES</p> | <p>2</p> | <p>3</p> <p>NON-FARM PRODUCTIVITY</p> <p>8:30 AM Q/Q (AR) Y/Y 04:Q3 (R) 1.8 3.1 04:Q4 (P) 0.8 2.5 04:Q4 (R)</p> <p>ISM NON-MFG SURVEY 10:00 AM</p> | <p>4</p> <p>EMPLOYMENT SITUATION</p> <p>8:30 AM NON-FARM CIV AVG FARM UNEMP HRLY PAYROLL RATE EARN (000s) M % Y DEC 133 5.4 2.6 JAN 146 5.2 2.6 FEB</p> <p>MICHIGAN SENTIMENT (F) 9:45 AM</p> <p>FACTORY ORDERS</p> <p>10:00 AM M Y NOV 1.4 11.6 DEC 0.3 9.9 JAN</p> |

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